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The primary goal of this project is to offer a reliable measurement of medium-term changes of wage inequality and wage 
differentials in Croatia from 1970 (when the first data was collected) to 2008 (the most recent data available at the time of 
writing). This period covers, of course, a tumultuous time for Croatia and the Croatian economy: the fall of socialism, 
hyperinflation, and the Homeland war. We focus on the two most often used inequality measures, the Gini coefficient and the 
Theil index, using data on wage differences by level of education and vocational training and also by income intervals. We also 
examine differences over time in inequality for key industrial sectors that were arguable affected quite differently by the 
many shocks that the Croatian economy experienced over this time period.  
Before turning to the measurement of inequality, we begin, in the next section, with background on the labor market 
framework and institutions that characterized Croatia during these years.  The rich and dramatic institutional changes provide 
an opportunity to explain the inequality trends we find.  The analyzed period was marked by extensive institutional 
uncertainty and change, external shocks, macroeconomic instability and stabilization policies, often including incomes 
policies, while the economy was transformed into an upper-middle income economy. Certainly there was more than one 
dramatic event. It therefore seems justified to expect these changes could have influenced changes in both wage dispersion 
and wage inequality.  
We find that average wage differentials by education and vocational training narrowed slightly from 1970 through about the 
mid-1980s, increased through the mid-1990s and then stabilized.  Our analyses of inequality by income groups shows a similar 
pattern, with the Gini coefficient based on income interval data rising from the .20-25 range between 1970 and the mid-1980s 
to .30 and over since the late 1990s. In both measures, inequality rose subsequent to the economic transition; overall 
inequality was higher in 2008 than in 1970 for the income interval data, but still lower, despite the increase in the 2000s, for 
the educational/vocational attainment data. Changes in inequality did vary considerably across industrial sectors.  We do not, 
however, find evidence that industries that transitioned from state-controlled to market-based experienced the largest Page | 2  
 
increase in inequality. Instead, the biggest change was in the financial sector, where foreign direct investment was 
substantial.   
2. Labor Markets in Croatia - Background and Institutional Details  
In this section, we review the institutional context in which Croatian labor markets operated during this period. From 1970 to 
2008, Croatia and Croatian labor markets were exposed to an almost continuous series of shocks, among which institutional 
shocks were the most important. These institutional shocks ranged from social engineering of the most fundamental kind to 
demand management stabilization policies. Arguably the greatest changes were during the period from 1989 to 1991 when 
the three largest changes in Croatia's recent history coincided. First, of course, was the regime change from socialism to 
capitalism. Second, the internal market and area of arbitrage contracted as Yugoslavia decomposed and sovereign Croatia was 
established, shrinking the internal market from 22 million inhabitants to just over 4 million. Finally, the Homeland War started in 
late summer 1990 and continued through the summer of 1995. In addition to these fundamental changes, Croatia also 
experienced numerous smaller shocks like reforms (especially of the socialist ‘project’ during the early 1970s and mid-1980s), 
external shocks (the oil shock and foreign debt crises in the early 1980s), and numerous policy changes linked to stabilization 
policies in the early 1970s, the early and late 1980s, and the early 1990s. These stabilization policies regularly concentrated on 
external liquidity and curbing inflationary pressures; the inflation rate three times came to hyperinflationary proportions, in 
1980, in 1990 and in 1993 and were usually followed by institutional reform. 
Of course, all these changes had a great influence on the employment of labour, on labour allocation and labour outcomes, 
especially wage inequality and wage differentials. Indeed, as Section 4 shows, it is striking to what extent the latter two reflect 
changes in the institutional framework and macroeconomic policy objectives. As a result, the changes in wage inequality and 
wage differentials can quite convincingly be described by the sequence of shocks. This close relationship of wage inequality 
and wage differentials with the continuum of shocks provides the best justification for the reliance on the narrative approach 
being adopted.  Page | 3  
 
2.1 WAGE DETERMINATION DURING THE SOCIALIST PERIOD (1970-1990)
1 
The almost 40 year period under consideration can be divided into two almost equal sub-periods – the socialist period that 
lasted through 1989 and the capitalist period that followed.  In the socialist period, labour had a special position by virtue of 
the socialist ideology being applied. On the most general level, social justice was based on labour contributions (‘distribution 
according to labour and results of labour’) and labour was not accepted as a commodity. Therefore, labour markets could not 
be institutionally recognized. However, in Yugoslavia, which Croatia was an integral part of and with whom it shared an 
institutional and policy framework, this socialist ideology included two important further steps. First, the practice of workers’ 
self management, introduced in 1952, implied substantial firm independence and market exchange. All business decisions 
were taken independently by worker-appointed managers or by workers councils directly.  Through a sequence of 
institutional reforms, the scope of their decisions expanded over time at the expense of state regulation. But because socialist 
ideology limited markets, open, institutionalized and regulated markets existed only for final products, but not for factors of 
production. As a result capital and labour markets were unregulated and often covert informal markets.  Second, 
directive/central planning was abolished in practice in 1949 and institutionally in 1951.
2 These two features made the 
Yugoslav/Croatian variation a special and separate form of socialism formally called self-managing socialism and often 
referred to as the ‘Yugoslav experiment.’   
The institutional framework that translated these general principles into an operative economic system was developed over 
time through ‘social engineering,’ which took the form of a sequence of reforms. From 1970 to 1989, the institutional 
framework was developed as a backlash of the pro-market reforms of 1965 through a set of constitutional amendments in 
1971 (Miljevic et al. 1971 and Labcevski, 1972), which were then consistently set out in a new constitution in 1974 and in an 
especially important Law on Associated Labour in 1976 (Žuric, 1979). This institutional framework was reformed following the 
                                                                 
1 A voluminous literature on Yugoslav economic development exists. Some English sources for the material covered in this section can be 
found in Lydall (1984), Schrenk (1979), Cicin-Šain and Ellis (1986), Mencinger (2000) and Lang et al (1982), various issues of the semi-
official quarterly journal Yugoslav Survey and the edited volumes prepared for the regular Opatija yearly conference of Yugoslav 
economists published under the title Current problems of economic changes and economic policy of Yugoslavia (the 'red book'). 
2 Central planning of the allocation of resources ended in 1951 and of investments in 1972.  As a practical matter, the League of 
Communists, as the communist party was formally called after 1956, often acted as the final overt or covert decision-making 
body through a process known as ‘democratic centralism.’  
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report of the in 1982 Kreigher commission, which argued in favor of wide-ranging pro-market reforms (Lazovic, 1983).  In 
1983 the reforms included decentralization of wage decisions and in 1984 an accounting reform whereby personal incomes 
were last in line to be paid, so that all other contractual obligations had priority. However, this pro-market trend was 
backtracked after the completion of the Pašic commission report, which argued for a return to 'primary socialist goals' (i.e. 
fewer markets). It reaffirmed the ‘associated labour paradigm’ and the substitution of markets by self-managing agreements, 
making for an incoherent economic system (Mencinger, 2006). The system of associated labour and socialist self-management 
was finally transformed into a mixed ownership market economy in 1989 (Markovic, 1990). The final institutional remains of 
the system were formally eliminated in Croatia in the Christmas constitution in 1991 (Ustav Republike Hrvatske 1990). 
Looking at the 1970-1990 sub-period as a whole, institutional uncertainty is obvious, with changes never coherent and not 
always going in the same direction. 
The Yugoslav economic system, as it was defined in the institutional framework, had a built-in flaw with major repercussions 
for labour outcomes. This flaw concerns the pricing of capital and was well known as early as the 1950s
3. After the reforms of 
1965, firms paid no price for the capital resources they used; prior to that, interest was paid on the firm’s capital to a 
centralized federal fund, but this fund was abolished in 1965 for mistaken economic reasons and justified political reasons. 
This meant that once interest on loans and taxes were paid, self-managed firms were free to distribute net income and could 
channel and distribute capital income into personal incomes. The consequences of this were far-reaching and led to 
inefficiency. For example, capital became territorially immobile to protect rents and to maintain informal control of capital 
income, while capital-intensive sectors had a greater opportunity for higher wages due to higher capital income. The latter 
was possible since enterprises nominally had complete autonomy in determining the ‘wage fund’ and wage differentials’. 
 Labour outcomes, distributional policies and wage policies during the whole socialist period largely concentrated on 
neutralizing the disastrous effects and consequences of this flaw. This was also the main incentive for and preoccupation of 
distributional reforms, regulations and policies. The substance of these measures was to protect investments and 
accumulation from being crowded out by wages and to neutralize the effects of different sector capital endowments. 
Formally, this was attempted through a complex system of ‘social compacts’ and 'self-management agreements' that 
                                                                 
3 An early example is Ward's 'Illyrian firm' from the mid-1950s (Ward, 1958). Yugoslav/Croatian economists were also well aware of it.  Page | 5  
 
constrained the enterprise’s freedom in the distribution of income and regulated inter-sector average wages.  As a result, 
“The basic principles and criteria for the distribution of income and the allocation of funds to personal incomes are laid down 
by workers in line with the basic principles and criteria established by self-management agreements and social 
contracts“(Miljevic, 1971:8).  
Under such circumstances during the socialist sub-period, one could assume there was a continuous underlying pressure for 
an increase in wages and wage differentials in line with opportunity costs. Lydall coments that “In the absence of a 
satisfactory theoretical basis for determining the level of personal income, Yugoslav enterprise pay out as much income as 
they can, given the market, political and administrative constraints to which they are subject“ (Lydall, 1984:240). 
The inability to build institutional coherence into the system of wages led to wage increases being regularly singled out as a 
major source of instability. This increasingly led to outright policy control. These policies never regulated wage differentials, 
which were respected as the prerogative of enterprise and self-management agreements, and only targeted the size of the 
enterprise wage fund, usually by limiting its increase to the rise in productivity. This made incomes policy of limited use as a 
demand management policy. Wage freezes were imposed in five major stabilization efforts, (1972, 1981, 1985, 1989 and 
again in 1990). But wage policies were also increasingly influenced by fear of social unrest as early as in 1981 (Nikic 1982) and 
this fear only rose with the economic stagnation and rising political demands of the eighties. 
2.2 WAGE DETERMINATION DURING THE CAPITALIST PERIOD (1990-2008)
4 
With regard to labour market outcomes concerning wages, the period after 1990 was in many respects much more stable 
than the previous. This may sound surprising given that the period started in 1990 with the three major shocks –economic 
transition, political independence, and the Homeland War– comparable to the largest shocks in Croatian history. The reason 
why stability was nevertheless greater is that after 1990 there was a continuous development of one coherent institutional 
                                                                 
4 Reliable monographs in English about the Croatian economy have been published by the World Bank, (World Bank, 2001, 2006) and 
other international institutions (UNDP, 2006; IMF, 2007). However, a detailed discussion on labour issues and especially wage inequality 
and wage determination is rarely present. Many of the points covered in the survey can be found in Franicevic and Puljiz (2009), Jakopec 
(2007) Page | 6  
 
and regulatory system (which, after EU membership negotiations started, was largely influenced by the acquis communitaire) 
and after the successful 1993 stabilization policy there was price and exchange rate stability.
5  
Regarding labour outcomes and wage inequality, the most important event was the economic transformation. Capitalism 
envisaged a fundamentally different role of labour than socialism. This in turn implied two fundamental changes for wage 
inequality and wage differentials. The first was the acceptability of labour markets and capital markets, so that wage 
inequality and wage differentials could be viewed as labour market outcomes reflecting opportunity costs. The second was 
the abolition of the egalitarian ideology and its consequent regulation of incomes. With the transformation, the inherited 
institutional framework of the socialist period was formally declared unacceptable and it was abolished.  
In the mid-1990s, the first post-socialist institutional framework regulating labour relations was developed. A new Labour 
Code was passed by Parliament in 1995 that still maintained substantial labour market inflexibility; until then, the socialist law 
regulating 'working /labour relations' was operative. It was revised in 2003 when a new Labour code was passed that radically 
transformed the labour markets in three important ways:  the state lost its monopoly on job mediation; the labor market was 
liberalized and unemployment benefits were revised, reducing entitlements; and the first elements of employment flexibility 
were introduced, reducing costs of layoffs and right to redundancy pay and unemployment benefits, and wage contract 
flexibility.  
Parallel to the development of the institutional framework regulating labour markets and employment contracts was the 
development of the institutions of collective bargaining. The first national collective contract was signed in autumn 1992, but 
the government, with the approval of the trade unions, immediately suspended the parts related to wages and wage 
differentials because of the Homeland War.
6 In late 1992 a separate collective contract was signed for the public sector, which 
at that time covered over two-thirds of the economy. The tripartite body representing government, trade unions, and 
employers was established in 1994, marking the beginning of modern wage bargaining and collective contracts.  From 1994 
                                                                 
5 The new institutional framework was heavily influenced by the international financial community through conditionality, most notably 
the World Bank and its financial support, and the IMF with whom Croatia signed a stand-by agreement in 1994 and later in 2001. 
6 It did this until 1994 by a series of decrees. Page | 7  
 
on, two-year collective contracts started to be signed, with sector and 'house' (firm level and mostly limited to large firms) 
contracts derived from them.
7  
With respect to wage inequality and wage differentials, the collective contract defines the elements that should be included in 
determining wages and it defines the wage as the sum of three parts:  the basic wage, the stimulative part, and the additions. 
Although no reliable studies are available, experienced observers estimate that perhaps 60% of firms pay above the basic 
wage, on average about 20% more. The collective contract has another important component. It defines wage differentials for 
eight wage classes and 24 wage brackets, all linked to levels of professional attainment. Initially they were expressed as 
multiples of the basic wage of unskilled labour, but more recently they are in terms of the national average wage from the 
previous period.  Because of the very large state and public sector, the multiples for state employees are especially important.  
The 1994 agreement was defined in terms of 24 multiples (coefficients) expressed relative to unskilled labour and a range of 
5.85:1. The 2001 revision of the multiples has a relative range of 6.36 and this is higher than the 5.85 from 1994 and would 
seem to imply a decompression.  After 2000 there was an increasingly widespread practice of 'managerial contracts' that 
regulate the payments of some employees by direct individual negotiations and personal contracts not subject to the 
collective agreement.  
In contrast to the socialist period when there was almost a continuum of stabilization policies, during the whole period after 
1990 there was only a single attempt of an incomes policy, in October 1993. Again this was linked to a stabilization issue, this 
time the post-transformation hyperinflation of 1993.
8 The incomes policy was part of a stabilization package and it was 
targeted at regulating the increase of the wage bill in the non-privatized sector, at that time, by EBRD estimates, over 80% of 
the economy.
9 Even though a collective contract was accepted in 1992, the government introduced an incomes policy as part 
of the stabilization program. It suspended the negotiated wage differentials and introduced a wage freeze. Through a 
continuum of discretionary decisions and decrees, by-laws and other ways, the government regulated the rise of the wage 
fund below GDP growth. The stabilization policy was a complete success and Croatia has enjoyed low inflation rates since, so 
that the wage bill regulation was abolished in 1994 and since then there has been no government wage policy. 
                                                                 
7 In 2009 there were 845 registered collective contracts at all levels  and 800 'house' contracts, covering about 850.000 employees (Begic 
2010, p:219).  
8 The monthly October 1993 inflation was almost 30%. 
9 The policy was based on forward-looking indexing that envisaged a 24.9% increase in October and 4% increase in subsequent two 
months and zero wage bill growth in the first half of 1994 (all corrected for changes in employment); see Anušic et al 1995, p:87 passim. Page | 8  
 
2.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Croatian economy was subjected to a continuous stream of institutional shocks.  Indeed during the entire period from 
1970 to 2008 there was never a period longer than four years without some such shock.  Even though many shocks were not 
primarily or only targeting labour allocation and outcomes, there is ample justification to expect that each in its way did have 
an important influence on labour.  In a monetary economy this influence should be reflected in wage inequality and wage 
differentials.  Before attempting to establish this link between institutional change and wage inequality and wage differentials 
it is necessary to explain the available data and the inequality measures that will be used.  This is the topic of the next section. 
3. MEASURING WAGE INEQUALITY AND WAGE DIFFERENTIALS 
3.1 DATA  
We use two data sources for the analysis of wage dispersion and wage inequality from the early 1970s through 2008 in 
Croatia. The first data source is the distribution of registered fully employed workers
10 categorized by income intervals (net 
take-home wage) and the second is the distribution of employment and average net wage by a worker’s level of education 
and vocational training. Both data sources were collected by the official government statistical office. Until 1990 this was the 
Republican Statistical Office (RZS) that was part of the Yugoslav system of statistics; since 1991, the data have been collected 
by the Republic of Croatia Central Bureau of Statistics (DZS). Until 2004 all data was published only in paper form, so all pre-
2004 data needed to be transferred to electronic form before further analysis.  
The period we analyze was chosen for reasons of data availability of these two data sets. The data for employment and wages 
by education and vocational training are available approximately every other year beginning in 1970 through 1988, and then 
annually from 1996 to 2008. The 1988-1996 employment data are unavailable, although we do have average wage data for 
each group in these years; this gap coincides with the breakup of Yugoslavia (1990) and the Homeland war (1991-1995). The 
grouped income interval data are available annually beginning in 1973, with the exception of 1980-81.  
                                                                 
10 Fully employed workers are those who work at least 182 hours a month.  Partially employed workers are omitted.  Page | 9  
 
Data for both datasets is collected in a regular survey conducted by the official statistical office.
11  Until 1995 the survey was 
conducted twice annually, (31st March and 30th September), except in 1980 and 1981 when only September data was 
collected due to preparations for the 1981 population census. After 1996 it was collected once every year in March. In order 
to make our analysis uniform, we chose to use only March data for every year in the sample.
12  From March 1991 until March 
1995 data from the temporarily occupied territories are omitted. With the end of the Homeland war in 1996, the data refer to 
the whole country, as does the data before September 1991 (Statistical Yearbook, 2007, pp.79-85, 114-120).  
In the educational/ vocational attainment data set, educational attainment is defined officially as "the highest level of 
education acquired by a person upon completing an appropriate school or course, sitting for exams or receiving recognition 
based on proving educational attainment in a business entity. The level acquired can be proved by the appropriate official 
document (diploma, certificate, degree)" (Statistical Yearbook (2007), p.115). Since the official classification groups all 
Doctors, Masters and Bachelors under the University Degree variable, for simplicity and clarity of exposition, we refer to this 
group as Advanced Degree (Adv Ed). Advanced Degree is followed by the Non-university college degree (Nu Coll), Secondary 
school education (Sec Ed), Basic school education (Basic Ed), Highly-skilled (HighSk), Skilled (Skilled), Semi-skilled (SemiSk) and 
Unskilled (Unsk) levels. The number of levels of educational/ vocational attainment did not change over the time period and 
are in agreement with definitions used by the ILO, so the data is comparable over the entire analyzed period. 
The monetary denomination changed several times during the analyzed period due to currency changes. In January 1990 the 
Yugoslav dinar (YUD) was substituted by the Convertible dinar (10,000 YUD = 1 Convertible dinar). By the end of 1991 the 
official currency in Croatia was the Croatian dinar (HRD) with 1 Convertible dinar being equal to 1 HRD. As a consequence of 
high inflation in May 1994, the Croatian kuna (HRK) was introduced, with 1,000 HRD being equal to 1 HRK. Thus, the income 
data from 1973 until 1985 are in Yugoslav dinar (YUD), data for 1988 in Convertible dinar, 1990-1993 data in Croatian dinar 
(HRD,) and data after 1993 in Croatian kuna (HRK).  
When we examine real wages, we transform all wages into kuna, using 2005 prices. Our inflation adjustment combines two 
different price indices. Prior to 1998, no complete CPI exists, so we use information on retail price indices. Retail prices are 
                                                                 
11 Until 1989 this was the RAD-1 questionnaire completed by firms in the census and from 1996 the RAD-1G questionnaire. 
12 The 1996 changes were a result of the completion of the Homeland war in 1995 after which statistics were re-organized. Page | 10  
 
"prices that a consumer pays for certain products or services in retail trade. The statistics monitors the prices at which, during 
the reported period, the biggest quantities of selected products are sold at the selected selling points" (Statistical Yearbook 
2008, p.185). Beginning in 1998, we use the official Consumer Price Index for Croatia. Our combined price series, obtained 
from the Republic of Croatia Central Bureau of Statistics, is presented in Appendix Table 1.  Our retail price index may 
overstate inflation if wholesale prices increased more slowly than these prices. This, in turn, would affect our calculations of 
real wages, but would not affect our estimates of wage dispersion and wage inequality, since these are based on relative 
wages.  
In neither data set do we have access to true microdata that would enable us to compute ideal measures of overall inequality. 
The grouped income interval data are non-overlapping, but the intervals were not always adjusted fully for changes in 
nominal wages. As a consequence, we are not able to estimate inequality caused by high earners as consistently across the 
time periods as we would like.
13 The attainment data are preferable in this respect, but they are obviously from potentially 
overlapping distributions. For example, the net wage of the highest paid skilled worker may by higher than that of the lowest 
paid non-university college degree worker and so on. Finally, the interval data are for full-time workers only, so this also works 
to reduce measured inequality. Our general strategy is to work with both data sets, note the probable biases involved, and 
see if a reasonably clear consensus nevertheless emerges.  
3.2 Methods 
We calculate two standard inequality measures, the Gini coefficient and the Theil index. The Gini is a common and intuitively 
understandable measure. The Theil is less well known but has some attractive properties.  
The Gini coefficient is "the average difference between all possible pairs of income in the population, expressed as a 
proportion of total income" (Cowell, 1995, p.23) and lies between 0 for an egalitarian distribution and 1 for maximum 
inequality. It is often expressed graphically as the ratio of the area between the Lorenz Curve and the line of perfect equality 
to the entire area under the perfect equality line.  
                                                                 
13 We assume that the average income in the top bracket is twice the minimum threshold in that bracket.  The percent of workers in that 
top bracket varies from as little as .5% to as much as 8-10% (1985 and 1989).  Page | 11  
 
The Theil measure was originally derived from information theory (Theil, 1967). However, it is readily interpretable as a 
measure of inequality. Conçeicao, Galbraith, and Bradford (2001) show that its formula can be re-arranged as a "direct 
measure of the discrepancy between the distribution of income and the distribution of individuals” (Conçeicao, Galbraith, 
Bradford, 2001, p.492). Thus, for example, if a group has the same share of income as its share of the population, it does not 
contribute to inequality. The Theil index is, like the Gini, bounded at 0 for perfect equality, but, unlike the Gini coefficient, it 
does not have a natural maximum value; rather, its maximum is a function of the number of income units. In our analysis, 
however, this is not a problem, because during the whole period the number of levels of educational attainment (8), while the 
14 income brackets for the distribution of net wages in the 1970s can easily be reduced to the 13 published for the second 
part of the period. This allows for the comparability of the Theil index during the period. 
Conçeicao, Galbraith, Bradford show further that "the structure of the Theil index measuring inequality between individuals is 
similar to the Theil index structure measuring inequality between groups" (Conçeicao, Galbraith, Bradford, 2001, p.492). This 
is particularly valuable when aggregate data is available instead of individual data: the between-group element of the Theil 
index can be used as a lower bound for the population's value of Theil statistics.  
Each of the two inequality measures can be calculated in two ways, depending on whether the underlying data is grouped or 
ungrouped. Given our data, we use the appropriate grouped data formulas. For the Gini coefficient, we compute both lower 
and upper bounds. The upper and lower bounds estimation is necessary since we know nothing about the distribution of 
incomes within groups. The Gini upper bound values assume maximum inequality within every bracket (i.e., all income 
recipients have either the maximum or minimum income in the bracket), while the Gini lower bound values assume no 
inequality in any wage bracket (all income recipients have income equal to the mean of the income bracket). Equations (1) 
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In equations (1) and (2), n is the number of observations, y is individual income,   is average income, ai are income classes 
with upper and lower boundary values, k is the total number of income classes, µ is class mean and i is population relative 
frequency in income class i.  































In (3), n is the number of observations, y is total income and m is the number of groups. As equation (3) shows, the grouped 
Theil index can be interpreted as an income-weighted average of the natural log of the ratio of a group’s income share to its 
population share.  
Because the Theil measure is less familiar than the Gini, it is worth noting some of its properties. In a very simple economy 
with two equally sized groups, the Theil index ranges from 0 when both groups have equal incomes to 0.6371 when one group 
has 1% of the income and the other has 99%.
14 In a more extreme case where one group has 1% of the population and 99% of 
the income and the other group has the remaining income and population, the Theil index equals 4.559. As can be seen in (3), 
if a group’s income share equals its population share, then its contribution to the Theil index is 0 (=ln 1). A group with an 
income share greater than its population share contributes positively to the index and a group with an income share less than 
its population share contributes negatively. For income shares greater than population shares, the contribution to the index is 
an increasing function of the difference in the shares, as expected. The contribution of groups with less income than their 
population share is more complicated, because algebraically they contribute negatively to the inequality index as if they 
reduced inequality. With a bit of arithmetic, it is not hard to show that a group with a very low income to population share 
ratio will have a negative Theil contribution that is small in absolute value, that is, it reduces the Theil index less (and is 
compensated for by another group that will have an income share greater than its population share).  
For the analysis of the Theil index, we also present a decomposition that shows the contributions of each subgroup to overall 
measured inequality (Conçeicao and Ferreira, 2000). This allows us to identify the specific sources of the change in inequality. 
                                                                 
14 Using equation (3), in this example T=.01 x ln (.01/.5) + .99 x ln(.99/.5) = -.0391+.6763 =.6371. Page | 13  
 
As explained above, the decomposition of the Theil index has both positive and negative contributions, which are a function 
of both the relative population and income shares and the weighting for each group. Changing contributions to the index can 
occur either when the relative population and income shares or when the weighting changes.   
3.3 Wage dispersion in Croatia, 1970-2008 
Before turning to wage inequality, we first show in Figure 1 the path of average real wages in Croatia. We use average wages 
from our two data sets, both to show the broad trend and to examine the comparability of the two income sources. Average 
income is provided directly in the attainment data set; in the income interval data, we compute it from the average income in 
each bracket, assuming that the average bracket income equals the bracket midpoint and that the average income in the top 
bracket is twice its minimum.  Because 1974 is the earliest year with data in both data sets, we begin our series in that year 
and normalize both series to 100. Not all the years are available in each data set. As we noted earlier, our real wage 
adjustment is sensitive to the measurement of price changes, and we do not have a full consistent price index series.    
The two average wage series are reasonably close to one another, which is reassuring, and they tell a consistent story. The 
path of average wages shows four distinct time paths: reasonably steady growth from 1970 to 1978; a steady decline from 
1978 to 1988 during which wages fell by about 35% in the attainment data and by more than half in the interval data; 
precipitous declines in 1989 (information available in the income interval data only) and again from 1990 to 1993 when wages 
fell by another two-thirds and bottomed out at just 15-30% of the 1974 level; and then a steady recovery through 2008 that 
brought average wages back to almost 90% of the 1974 level in the attainment data and just barely above the 1974 average in 
the interval data.  As shown in the figure, the volatile 1988-94 period corresponds to the major external shocks, including two 
bouts of hyperinflation.  
 We begin our analysis with the most often-used approach to wage dispersion, i.e. the calculation of annual changes of 
relative nominal average wages by skill group. Figure 2 depicts the time path of relative wages for each educational and 
vocational group relative to the average wage in that year.  For example, the top line shows that workers with an advanced 
degree earned about twice the economy-wide average in 1970, but have lost ground since in three distinct episodes (1970-78, 
1978-90, and 1990-99). Since 2000, their relative income has been stable at a figure about 60% about the overall average. The Page | 14  
 
other two groups initially well above the average –those with a non-university college degree (Nu Coll) and those with high 
skill vocational training (HighSk)—also experienced a decrease in their relative earnings. The time path of wages is similar to 
that of the workers with an advanced degree, but somewhat more moderate. By the end of the period, their wages were 19% 
(Nu Coll) and 6% (HighSk) above the average, compared to 50% in 1970. 
Average wages for workers with a secondary education level fell from 12% above the average to nine percent below the 
average; they are the only group which crosses from above to below the average. The groups with average wages below the 
1970 average all experienced a decline in their relative wage, so they clearly contributed to wage inequality. The decline is 
least, though, for the two groups with the lowest 1970 wages – semi-skilled and unskilled workers.  
It is interesting to see how the shape of the whole distribution changed.  The common perception is that there was an 
artificial compression of wage differentials during socialism (the first 20 years of the period under review) when there were no 
institutionalized labor markets and substantial egalitarian pressures. The same common perception is that the liberalization of 
labor markets in the beginning of the transformation should lead to a significant decompression of wage differentials. The 
data in figure 2 certainly do not support this. Taking the most primitive measure of the ratio of the highest (advanced degree) 
and lowest (unskilled labor) average shows that the introduction of markets actually reduced the relative range. Also, the 
average of those with an advanced degree, a non-university college education and highly skilled workers are during the whole 
period above the average, but their relative position in the capitalist period is significantly below that in the first period. Of 
course, one must remember that the data points are averages representing a whole distribution and that the distributions are 
mutually overlapping. 
Visually, the figure suggests a probable decline in overall between group inequality between 1970 and the early to mid-1990s 
and an increase thereafter. In 1970, average group wages ranged from 67% to 200% of the overall average, while in both 1985 
and 1994, the range of average wages was from 70% to 155%. In 2008, the range was from 62% to 158% of the mean. But 
because the various groups had different relative changes and because average wages decline both for groups originally Page | 15  
 
above the mean (inequality reducing) and below the mean (inequality increasing), it is not possible to draw a clear conclusion 
about the direction of overall inequality. 
15 
Figure 3 uses the average wages by educational and vocational attainment to compute grouped Gini and Theil inequality 
indices. In computing both measures, we assume that all workers in a group receive the average income of that group, an 
assumption that clearly reduces the overall inequality.
16  In effect, we compare the difference between group income and 
population shares across all the groups whose income trend was shown in Figure 2.  Both measures reveal the same pattern. 
Overall between-group inequality declined through the early 1980s, bottoming out in 1983.  Our data points are thinner over 
the next dozen years, but by both measures, inequality remained about the same through 1996.  Then inequality increased 
steadily through 2001, rising back to its level in the early 1970s.  Since then, both measures indicate that inequality has 
stabilized at this higher level.  
We can use the Theil measure to identify the source of the increase in inequality, since each group makes a uniquely-
identifiable numerical contribution to the index.  To simplify the exposition, we have combined like groups:  non-university 
and secondary education; high-skilled and skilled workers; and semi-skilled workers and those with basic education.  Workers 
at the extremes of the skill distribution (Advanced education and unskilled) are kept in their own group.  Figure 4 shows the 
result of this decomposition of the Theil index.  In each year, the sum of the group values equals the total inequality index 
shown in Figure 3; over these years, the index fell from .055 to .043.   The time pattern is one in which the workers with 
advanced educational degrees contribute an increasing amount of inequality, beginning in about 1988, while the other groups 
contribute an offsetting decrease.  The four other groups effectively converge in their inequality contribution by the early 
2000s.  The explanation turns on changing relative importance of the group, rather than a wholesale change in income shares 
relative to population.  In 1970, workers with advanced education had an income share twice their population share 
compared to 60% more in 2008, but their share of the population and of income more than tripled.  As a result, that group is 
the primary driver of inequality simply as a function of increasing size.  In contrast, unskilled workers actually had a lower 
                                                                 
15 It is interesting to compare these relative wage trends to those in the US and Western Europe over this time period. In the US, wage 
differences by education declined through the mid-1970s, but have increased steadily and substantially since then. 
16 In the US context, much of the observed increase in inequality is within educational groups.  See Juhn, Murphy, & Pierce (1998).  Page | 16  
 
share of income relative to their group size in 2008 than in 1970, but their share of employment fell by two-thirds, from 25% 
to 8.1%. 
3.4 Wage inequality in Croatia, 1970-2008 
It is interesting to relate wage inequality results based on attainment to the wage inequality based on the distribution of all 
fully employed workers by their net or take-home wage.  This section thus analyzes overall wage inequality (inequality of 
take-home wages). All fully employed workers are included, regardless of their age and other characteristics. Ideally, following 
Lydall (1968) and Phelps (1977), one would want the distribution of a certain age cohort homogenous in all ways except with 
regard to wages, e.g. the distribution of net wages of full time employed by gender/nationality/race of a certain age. These 
distributions are, however, almost nonexistent, so one is forced to use ‘contaminated’ data involving heterogeneous 
individuals.  
The data does not contain the average of the distribution, thus when calculating Gini coefficients with upper and lower 
values, some assumptions have been made. First, we assume that the first income bracket starts at zero income, thereby 
neglecting that also negative incomes could exist. Second, we assume the mean income of each income bracket is just the 
average of the lower and the upper bound. Thirdly, we assume the mean income of the upper bracket is twice the lower 
bound in that bracket. The percent of workers in that top bracket varies from as little as .5% to as much as 8-10% (1985 and 
1989). The results are depicted in Figure 5.  
One would expect socialism and capitalism regimes to have stable movements in inequality with socialism having a lower 
trend value, but looking at Figure 5 it is clear that both Gini and Theil indices show the same dynamics of a secular increase in 
overall wage inequality. The initial, 1973 Gini was 0.21 and the final, 2008 Gini was 0.32; the Theil index increased similarly, 
from 0.077 to 0.193.  Figure 5 also indicates a period of stable increases in inequality at the beginning of the period (from 
1973 to 1979) and at the end (from 2000 to the latest data) with cyclical variations around a rising trend between them. The 
1980s and 1990s were very turbulent with two distinctive periods of rising wage inequality (1989 and 1998). The instability is 
not surprising considering that during that 20-year period there was a regime change (starting in 1989), the military conflict 
(1991-1995) and the continuum of short-term macroeconomic stabilization policies (1982, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1992 and 1993).  Page | 17  
 
Many of the year-to-year movements appear to reflect the impact of stabilization policies.  For example, the fall in inequality 
from 1979 to 1982 is almost certainly the result of incomes policies. Inflation and balance of payment problems led to a 
stabilization policy in 1979 and then, after it failed, a drastic stabilization policy in 1981. Inequality rose between 1983 and 
1985 as the income policy was ended and a pro-market climate was created.  The exceptional rise in 1989 appears to be 
related to timing. There was accelerating macroeconomic instability (inflation balance-of-payments, etc.) and wage 
deregulation. Income data is gathered in March, prior to the implementation of a very rigorous stabilization policy in June- 
The rise is consistent with rising instability and the fall with a stabilization policy. 
The rising wage inequality from 1991 to 1993 likely reflects the chaotic period linked to the decomposition of Yugoslavia and 
the imposition of new transformation policies that made a complete break with the socialist regime with privatization and 
market liberalization coinciding with the Homeland war which was financed through inflation. The government attempted to 
control wages, but with accelerating inflation real wages fell dramatically. The falling inequality observed between 1993 and 
1995 coincides with the implementation of a successful anti-inflation policy, which included a strict control over the firm wage 
fund and frozen wage differentials. Furthermore, the wage differentials agreed in collective bargaining were suspended. 
Wage inequality then increased again from 1995 through the spike in 1998. During this period wage differentials were 
deregulated and the economy started postwar renewal. Inequality fell in 1999 back to the pre-spike trend.  There were no 
new policies or any significant institutional change that could explain the changes in the same was as in previous such events. 
There was, however, a recession in 1999 (negative growth rates) and an increasing number of wage arrears started in 1998. 
The last period is from 2000 to 2006, a time of small but steady increases in wage inequality. In January 2000 a new 
government came into power and the era of authoritarian dictatorship ended. Not less important, the country stopped being 
an international pariah and an Accession and Stability Pact was signed with the EU in 2001 leading to the start of EU 
membership negotiations in 2004 and NATO membership in 2005. Regarding labour it was also a period of high growth, 
largely financed by a rising foreign debt, and rising employment. Even the labour market reforms of 2003 do not seem to have 
had an effect. 
Figure 5 shows two, one-year period spikes in inequality in 1989 and in 1997. The 1988-89 spike could be related to problems 
created by the difficulty in predicting inflation at the time wages were negotiated in December.  It was a period of rising Page | 18  
 
inflation, so the distribution moved in the favor of top brackets.  After successful stabilization in the early 1980’s, there was a 
policy principle of "targeted inflation" after 1986 that led to a surge in wages and inequality, inflation and trade deficit. It was 
also the time of rising political uncertainty with the demise of socialism and the erosion of communist party power. Overall 
the turmoil of the 1980s led to a new stabilization policy in 1989 (so called May Measures).   
The 1997-98 spike is harder to explain by the doubtful statistics since it was a period of price stability and there were no 
special policies or other changes.  But there was at the time a rise in wage arrears, reaching 15-20% of the labor force that got 
irregular payments.
17 Rising wage arrears should increase inequality if workers at the lower end of the distribution were more 
subjected to it. What is also interesting to mention about the period is the increasing unofficial economy, estimated at the 
time to be about 25% (Katarina 2002), and probably more important, increasing tax evasion (reducing social security and 
health payments by paying everything over the minimum wage in cash). Wage-related tax evasion should reduce formal 
inequality, if only higher wages were more subjected to it, hence the fall in 1999. In 1999 VAT was introduced, which is self-
enforcing, so incentives changed. 
As mentioned in the section on wage dispersion, a very useful characteristic of the Theil index concerns its decomposability. 
This allows us to see which groups contributed most to the changing level of inequality. The results are shown in Figure 6.  
Thirteen income groups are too many to show visually, so we combine adjacent groups to simplify the presentation. We 
combine the bottom three income groups, intervals 4-6, 7-9, and 10-maximum. As explained earlier, groups with an income 
share larger than their employment share increase the Theil index and do so more, the greater the disparity between the two 
shares.  Groups with an income share smaller than their employment share decrease the Theil index, but do so by less, the 
smaller is their population share.  To provide context with the inequality trend, we also shown the overall Theil index; it is the 
second line from the top.   
We see in Figure 6 that the bottom six income brackets reduced over-all inequality, meaning their share in employment is 
larger than their share in the wage fund.  More importantly, the trend for these two groups is not especially volatile; their 
contribution is virtually identical at the beginning and end of the period and does not vary much in between. The interesting 
feature of Figure 6 is that the two lines depicting changes in the top end of the income distribution are almost mirror images 
                                                                 
17 There is no hard data to support this claim. Page | 19  
 
during the whole period:  the declining inequality contribution of the upper-middle brackets is compensated for – and then 
some—by the increasing income share and population share of the top brackets. Furthermore the top three intervals follow 
the changes in overall inequality quite closely and fall with every stabilization/anti-inflation policy and expand with every 
deregulation. On the basis of this, it seems that these policies asymmetrically reduce incomes in the top end while lowest 
incomes change less. For example, a stabilization policy may reduce the inequality contribution of the top end both be 
reducing its income and reducing its share while the ‘bunching in the middle’ may actually increase the share of the top 
quarter.  
Another interesting feature concerns the two periods of stable changes in wage inequality (1973-1978 and 2001-2006). 
Looking at the decomposition data they appear different. The first period implies a level of volatility among all groups but the 
second has a stable structure and stable change in overall inequality. A further characteristic is that during the latter period all 
income brackets expect the top 3 reduce inequality with the contribution of the top end of the distribution increasing. This 
may mean that according to the Theil decomposition after 2000 the increase in inequality resulted from the rising economic 
fortunes at the top end of the distribution.   
3.5 Sectoral wage inequality 
This section deals with the wage inequality in different industrial sectors of the Croatian economy. We organized sectors into 
broad categories depending on the "shocks" they faced during the transition from a centrally-planned economy to a 
decentralized one. We identified four different categories of sectors and shocks that arguably might have resulted in different 
labor market responses that would generate different changes in inequality.  
The first is a sector whose firms were continually exposed to market competition and that continually operated under market 
pressures. They faced competition both on the internal market and in exports. I n the internal market the competition came 
from other domestic firms, imports and FDI.  On the external market they competed through exports. As a result, during the 
whole period they were in a 'contestable market' position so the transformation may not have implied such a large change. 
The second category was for firms in a sector that during the whole period was heavily subsidized and state owned.  One 
would not expect firms in this sector to go through the process of transformation-inspired change. The third category was for Page | 20  
 
firms in a sector especially hard hit by the transformation, typically because the sector was made artificially large under 
socialism and so, with the loss of government support and subsidies, had to undergo major structural downsizing. The fourth 
were firms in a sector that attracted FDI. This sector underwent change because prior to 1990 this was not an available option 
and with FDI came new management techniques, business ethics and technologies.  
The sectors representing of each of these scenarios were chosen on the basis of the actual experience of industrial sectors.  
We used textiles to represent the continuously competitive sector.  Textiles were largely restructured and downsized and 
faced increasing competition from overseas producers in all market segments but were never subsidized.  Shipbuilding is our 
example of a continually state-owned and subsidized sector: shipbuilding enjoyed a boom in socialism and its system of 
regulated foreign trade and has remained in state ownership, heavily subsidized. In spite of multiple attempts, it has been 
unable to restructure.  As an example of a transformation-changed sector, we use metal machinery and equipment. (Croatia 
had a large machine and equipment producing sector, which largely supplied other parts of Yugoslavia and other socialist 
countries. It could be labeled a transformation ‘loser’.  Finally, as a high FDI sector, we use financial intermediates.  This is also 
a sector against whose development socialism explicitly opposed.  Now over 85% of banking assets in Croatia are foreign 
owned.  In many ways, this industry is a likely transformation winner. 
 Levels of inequality across sector are not meaningfully comparable because the underlying employment structure may vary; 
some may intrinsically have more homogeneous employment than others and thus have lower baseline levels of wage 
inequality. The issue we focus on is the change in inequality.  
To simplify the analysis, we compare inequality changes across two time periods, one before the major shocks and one 
afterwards. Most of the transitional shocks occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  To provide a broader sample and 
avoid possible problems that might arise from a single potentially unrepresentative year, we use two four-year periods, 1983-
1986 and 2003-2006. We use the Gini coefficient as our inequality measure. The analysis is based on the income interval data, 
available separately by industry, which was previously used in Figures 5 and 6. The results of this analysis are given in Figure 7. 
 The results are generally as expected. All sectors experienced a rise in wage inequality, consistent with the overall trend in 
the economy.  The largest increase in inequality occurred for the privatized, high FDI sector where the Gini index rose from Page | 21  
 
0.21 in the 1980's to 0.31 recently, an increase of almost 50%. Interestingly, this sector is known for employing foreign 
managers and for having boards dominated by foreigners and may, thus, be less constrained by domestic social norms.  The 
second largest increase is in the competitive sector (textiles).  The other two sectors both had very small increases.  But the 
increases did change the rankings.  The sector least influenced by the transformation (because they were always competitive, 
textiles or remained in state protection as shipbuilding) changed least. The ranking of the sector hardest hit by the 
transformation and the one that hosted most FDI changed most in opposite directions the transformation ‘loser’ has lowest 
wage inequality and the FDU one has the highest.  
 4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have used the available Croatian data on income by income intervals and by educational and vocational 
attainment to measure wage dispersion and wage inequality in Croatia from the early 1970s through 2008.  We also examined 
differences in inequality across industrial sectors, focusing on industries that experienced quite difference economic shocks 
during the transformation from socialism to capitalism.   
The data we use is far from ideal:  it has time gaps, it is aggregated, and the samples are not fully inclusive of all wage earners.  
Nevertheless, it tells a reasonably consistent story about the development of labor markets in Croatia. The period we examine 
is a tumultuous one in Croatian history, including, as it does, not only the transformation of the economy, but also the 
creation of sovereign Croatia, the Homeland War, multiple bouts of hyperinflation, and the initial integration into Europe.  
Table 1 summarizes the broad inequality trends by period (socialist through 1988 or 1990, capitalist thereafter).  Because our 
two inequality measures track similarly, we focus here on the Gini coefficient.  The income interval data, which is our 
preferred source for measuring inequality, shows that the Gini coefficient rose moderately in the socialist period and more 
strongly in the capitalist period.  There are considerable year-to-year fluctuations in both periods, but the average Gini 
coefficient value increased from .241 during the social period to .297 in the capitalist period.  The educational and vocational 
attainment data are consistent with this in part.  With this data, we find a decline in inequality in the socialist period, although 
it is largely a function of a relatively high initial year value (see Figure 3). Inequality clearly rises in the capitalist period, Page | 22  
 
especially (again see Figure 3) in the first decade of the transformation.  The percentage increase in the Gini coefficient is 
quite similar in the capitalist period for both data sets.   
Over the entire period, five commonalities spanning the socialist and capitalist periods are evident. The first is the long term 
increase in wage inequality in both periods. The second surprising characteristic is how responsive wage inequality is to policy 
and institutional changes. Every change in the trend but one can be linked to one or both of the two. This is true both of the 
socialist and capitalist periods. While one would expect this in a socialist economy where there was extensive regulation and 
government interference in the economy (overt or covert), it may be surprising for the capitalist period. Probably the 
extended transformation can best account for this. The only institutional change that did not have a visible impact on the data 
was the market deregulation of 2003. The third commonality is that every stabilization or anti-inflation policy significantly 
reduced wage inequality. This is true of four out of five stabilization policies in the socialist period (1971, 1979, 1981 and 
1989) and the only one in the capitalist period (1993). The only exception is the stabilization policy of 1990. Fourth, in both 
regimes every liberalization or loosening control over wages, either because income policies were terminated or through 
policy deregulation, led to a rise in wage inequality. 
 Finally, during the whole period there are only two sub-periods of extended stability in inequality. Interestingly, they appear 
at the beginning and end of the period and mark a stable and slow rise in wage inequality. In spite of major differences, they 
have important similarities. In both cases there was a policy of increasing the external debt which allowed for domestic 
consumption to exceed domestic production. The first one ended in a decade of instability, the final decomposition of 
Yugoslavia, and the economic transformation. It is not possible to say how the second one will end, but there are indications 
that there will be a prolonged recession. It is worth noting that two large non-economic shocks, independence in 1990 and 
the Homeland war from 1991-1995, do not appear in the data either as a ‘spike’ (what one may expect from the former) or a 
period of homogenous behavior (what one may expect from the latter).Page | 23  
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TABLE 1: WAGE INEQUALITY IN SOCIALIST AND CAPITALIST PERIODS, CROATIA, 1970-2008 
  Grouped Distribution of  
New  Wage 
Education and 
Vocational Attainment 
SOCIALIST PERIOD (1970-1989) 
Initial value (1970 or 1973)  .210  .179 
End of period value (1988 or 1990)  .254  .136 
Period Average   .241  .143 
CAPITALIST PERIOD (1990-2008) 
Initial value (1990)  .262  .136 
End of period value 2008  .333  .154 
Period Average    .297  .152 
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Appendix Table 1: Retail and Consumer Price Index, Croatia, 1970-2006 (1970=100) 
Year  Price Index  Annual Inflation Rate 
1970  100   
1971  116  16% 
1972  135  16% 
1973  160  19% 
1974  200  25% 
1975  255  27% 
1976  278  9% 
1977  316  13% 
1978  360  14% 
1979  443  23% 
1980  587  32% 
1981  849  45% 
1982  1,106  30% 
1983  1,554  40% 
1984  2,427  56% 
1985  4,254  75% 
1986  8,125  91% 
1987  17,924  121% 
1988  53,790  200% 
1989  699,269  1200% 
1990  4,961,311  609% 
1991  11,063,724  123% 
1992  84,692,810  666% 
1993  1,369,906,207  1518% 
1994  2,706,934,664  98% 
1995  2,761,730,913  2% 
1996  2,858,994,253  4% 
1997  2,961,737,219  4% 
1998  3,130,235,682  6% 
1999  3,255,445,109  4% 
2000  3,405,696,422  5% 
2001  3,534,036,085  4% 
2002  3,593,510,563  2% 
2003  3,656,115,277  2% 
2004  3,731,240,933  2% 
2005  3,856,450,360  3% 
2006  3,978,529,552  3% 
Note: Price Index is based on retail price index 1970-1998 and official CPI 1998-2006. 